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Hichilema and Another v Lungu and Another
(2016/CC/0031) [2016] ZMCC 4 (5 September 2016)
Majority Judgment
Muna Ndulo
The facts of this case were as follows: Following the August 11 Presidential
and Parliamentary elections, the petitioners filed an election petition in
the Constitutional Court to nullify the election of President Edgar Lungu,
on the grounds that the conduct of the August 11 elections breached the
Constitution, the electoral act and the electoral code of Zambia and that
consequently, the incumbent was not validly elected. Articles 101 (5) and
103 (2) of the Constitution state that election petitions filed pursuant to
those provisions must be heard within 14 days. The petition was filed on the
19th of August 2016, and as the 14 day period reached expiry, the hearing
of the petition had not commenced. The full bench of the Constitutional
Court decided unanimously on the night of Friday, September 2 2016,
that a four day hearing of the petition would commence on Monday,
September 5, 2016 and end on Thursday, September 8, 2016. Under this
arrangement, the petitioners would have two days to present their case,
and the respondent’s two days to defend it. However on the morning of
September 5, when the court met, purportedly to begin trial, three judges
(Mulonda, Mulenga, and Sitali) issued a majority ruling dismissing the
petition on the grounds that the 14 day period had expired and that as a
result, the court had no jurisdiction to hear the petition. Writing on behalf
of the three judges, Judge Sitali wrote, “The period for hearing the petition
is prescribed by the Constitution itself. The time frame is rigid and this
Court has not been given discretion to enlarge time”. Deciding on the fate
of the unheard petition, Judge Sitali noted, “the petition stood dismissed for
want of prosecution…and therefore failed by reason of that technicality.”
In this commentary, I argue that the September 5 decision of Justices
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Sitali, Mulonda and Mulenga to overturn a decision of the full bench
made on September 2, was illegal, irregular, and of no legal effect. First,
from the dissenting judgment of Judge Chibomba, we learn that the
dissenting judges had very little time to read the majority judgment. This
raises the following very serious questions: Exactly when and where did
the Judges’ conference to overturn the September 2 decision and arrive at
a new decision take place? Who called this meeting and in what context?
How it is that three judges can overrule a properly constituted full bench
decision at what was clearly an irregular meeting? Who reopened the
issue? When was the application for reopening made and to whom? Was
the application to reconsider the Friday ruling made to the full bench?
When was the application heard? The only logical conclusion is that
the three judges caucused over the weekend to arrive at the decision to
overturn the full bench ruling. They made the decision and wrote the
judgment without any submissions from the parties. This is conduct that
clearly subverts the judicial system.
Moreover, without any prior permission from the court, the lawyers of the
respondent were not in court on Monday for the scheduled hearing of the
case, stating that they did not want to participate in an illegality. A critical
question that immediately comes to the fore is this: do lawyers appearing
before a court have the authority to determine the illegality of an act? Is the
determination of legality and illegality not a hallowed judicial function?
Even in matters that touch on jurisdiction, it is the duty of the Court
to pronounce on its jurisdiction to hear a matter. However, in this case,
the respondents absented themselves from court without permission.
In so doing they not only demeaned the court, they also defiled the
collective rights of the Zambian people that the Court represents. It was
therefore unfortunate that the majority judgment, which condemned the
disrespectful conduct of the petitioner’s lawyer, did not equally condemn
the disrespectful behavior of counsel for the respondents.
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While it was right for the court to admonish the petitioners’ lawyers for
any misconduct, it is inconsistent and a show of partiality for the three
judges not to censure the respondent’s lawyers for failing to show up
in court on September 5. Unless of course, these lawyers sought and
received permission at the irregular weekend meeting that overturned the
majority verdict. An impartial court would have admonished both sides.
Compounding the irregularities described, above, I argue that the socalled judgment is wrong on the law, for the following reasons.
(1) First, the weekend meeting of the three judges that overturned the
September 2 ruling and produced a new ruling was irregular. It
cannot be justified under any tenet of law known to the Zambian
legal system or perceivable in any part of the common law legal
tradition. There was no motion filed to revisit the issue and there
were no new facts to reconsider. Moreover the petitioners had
reasonably relied on the unanimous decision of the Constitutional
Court and if judicial rulings prove unreliable, that signals the end
of democracy. A sub-group cannot form itself out of the whole and
overrule the whole. The attempt to overturn the full bench ruling is
a subversion of the judicial system and calls into question the fitness
of the three judges to hold judicial office. The three judges must read
the Commonwealth Bangalore Principles on Judicial Conduct to
learn about appropriate judicial conduct.
(2) The remedy the three judges purported to give is not provided for by
the Constitution. Article 103 (3) provides that “the Constitutional
Court may, after hearing an election petition- (a) declare the election
of the President-elect valid; or (b) nullify the election of the Presidentelect and Vice President.” In their In their rush to deliver judgment,
the three judges failed to read the law as it is; a court of law cannot
give a remedy not provided in law. The purported majority judgment
therefore has no legal basis.

15

Muna Ndulo

(3) On the question of the 14-day period, Article 103 (2) provides that
“The Constitutional Court shall hear an election petition relating to
the President-elect within fourteen days of the filing of the petition.”
There is no consequence provided for exceeding 14 days. Besides, the
section speaks about “hearing.” It nowhere mentions “determining.”
The article seems to have been drafted along the lines of a similar
provision in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution. In marked contrast, the
Kenyan provision talks about “hearing” and “determining”. Article
140 (1) of the 2010 of the Kenyan Constitution provides that: “(a)
A person may file a petition in the Supreme Court to challenge the
election of the President elect within seven days after the date of
the declaration of the results of the Presidential election; (b) Within
fourteen days after the filing of the petition, under clause (1) the
Supreme Court shall hear and determine the petition and its decision
shall be final”. The three judges cited the 2013 Kenyan Supreme
Court Presidential election petition as authority for their decision.
Apart from the difference pointed out in the Kenyan provision
concerning the 14-day limit, the Kenyan Supreme Court ensured
that all evidence presented by the parties was admitted via affidavits
and decided the case on the merits and not on procedural grounds.
The Kenyan court used the pre-trial conference to lay the ground
rules for the expeditious, fair, and efficient disposal of the petition.
Judicial powers ought to be exercised judicially and judiciously. That
is, judicial power must be exercised in the interest of substantial
justice and not to defeat the common will of the people.
(4) A hearing must be fair and equitable and not just a farce or a
choreography of absurdities as was seen in this case. Article 103
(2) should not and cannot be interpreted to deny petitioners their
constitutionally guaranteed right to be heard. A constitutional court
ought not to pander to narrow constructions that leave substantial
justice prostrate. Several courts from various parts of the world have
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dealt with this matter. First, is R v. Sussex Justices, exp. McCarthy1,
a leading English case on the impartiality and recusal of judges. It is
famous for establishing the precedent that mere appearance of bias is
sufficient to overturn a judicial decision. It also brought into common
parlance the oft-quoted aphorism: “Not only must justice be done;
it must also manifestly be seen to have been done.” Procedure and
technicalities are handmaids of law, they should never be made a tool,
to deny justice or perpetuate injustice by any oppressive or punitive
use. They should not become tyrannical masters and agents for the
destruction of justice.
The above point may have been most eloquently stated by Justice
Chuckwadifu Oputa in the Nigerian case of Aliu Bello & Others v.
Attorney-General of Oyo State2 when he held:
The picture of law and its technical rules triumphant and justice
prostrate may no doubt have its admirers. Nevertheless, the spirit
of justice does not reside in forms of formalities, or in technicalities,
nor is the triumph of the administration of justice to be found
in successfully picking one’s way between pitfalls of technicality.
Law and its technical rules ought to be but a handmaid of justice
and legal inflexibility (which may be becoming of law) may, if
strictly followed, only serve to render justice grotesque or even
lead to outright injustice. The court will not endure that mere
form or fiction of law, introduced for the scale of justice, should
work a wrong, contrary to the truth and substance of the case
before it.
As the Philippines Court of Appeal also put it in Aguam vs. Court of
Appeals3 :
1
2
3

[1924] 1 KB 256, [1923] All ER Rep 233.
(1986) 12 iLAW/SC.104/1985
388 Phil. 587 (2000).

17

Muna Ndulo
Dunia
P. Zongwe

beArticle
avoided.
law abhors
(3) On Technicalities,
the question of however,
the 14-daymust
period,
103The
(2) provides
that
technicalities
that Court
impedeshall
the cause
of election
justice.The
court’s
primary
“The
Constitutional
hear an
petition
relating
to
is to render
or dispense
litigation
notpetition.”
a game
the duty
President-elect
within
fourteenjustice.
days ofAthe
filing ofisthe
of technicalities.
Lawsuits
unlike
duels are 14
notdays.
to be
won bythea
There
is no consequence
provided
for exceeding
Besides,
rapier’s
thrust.
Technicality,
it deserts
its proper
office as an
section
speaks
about
“hearing.” when
It nowhere
mentions
“determining.”
to justice
becomes
great hindrance
Theaid
article
seemsand
to have
beenitsdrafted
along the and
lineschief
of a enemy,
similar
deserves
scant
consideration
from courts.
Litigations
must the
be
provision
in the
2010
Kenyan Constitution.
In marked
contrast,
decided
on their
not onand
technicality.
EveryArticle
party
Kenyan
provision
talksmerits
aboutand
“hearing”
“determining”.
must
be afforded
the amplest
opportunity
for the
proper
140litigant
(1) of the
2010
of the Kenyan
Constitution
provides
that:
“(a)
and just
determination
free Court
from the
unacceptable
A person
may
file a petitionofinhis
thecause,
Supreme
to challenge
the
plea of
election
of technicalities.
the President elect within seven days after the date of
the declaration of the results of the Presidential election; (b) Within
It is quite clear that the legal reasoning of the three judges was fatally
fourteen days after the filing of the petition, under clause (1) the
flawed and defied comparative jurisprudence from around the world.
Supreme Court shall hear and determine the petition and its decision
The petitioners were denied the panoply of their due process rights
shall be final”. The three judges cited the 2013 Kenyan Supreme
guaranteed under the Zambian constitution – the right to be heard by
Court Presidential election petition as authority for their decision.
an impartial tribunal. The technical argument used by Justices Mulonda,
Apart from the difference pointed out in the Kenyan provision
Mulenga and Sitale was simply an excuse and does not appear to be the
concerning the 14-day limit, the Kenyan Supreme Court ensured
real reason for their conduct.This judgment indicates that there is no clear
that all evidence presented by the parties was admitted via affidavits
separation between the judicial and executive branches of government
and decided the case on the merits and not on procedural grounds.
and that this lack of separation has led to a harmful politicization of the
The Kenyan court used the pre-trial conference to lay the ground
judicial system. The Judiciary branch of government is clearly beholden
rules for the expeditious, fair, and efficient disposal of the petition.
and subservient to the Executive branch, and the courts are plagued by
Judicial powers ought to be exercised judicially and judiciously. That
political influence. Moreover, the lack of a transparent system for the
is, judicial power must be exercised in the interest of substantial
appointment of judges and the concentration of the appointment system
justice and not to defeat the common will of the people.
in the presidency has meant that appointments and promotions in the
judiciary
are based
onbe
political
patronage
rather
than
(4) A hearing
must
fair and
equitable
and
notmerit,
just undermining
a farce or a
bothchoreography
the professionalism
and the independence
the institution.
of absurdities
as was seen inofthis
case. Article 103
(2) should not and cannot be interpreted to deny petitioners their
constitutionally guaranteed right to be heard. A constitutional court
ought not to pander to narrow constructions that leave substantial
justice prostrate. Several courts from various parts of the world have

18
16

